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gation declares: "The right to life is the primordial right of the human person. The 
person has other goods, some of them even more precious to him than life, but 
the right to life is the foundation and condition of all others." In other words, 
human beings possess God-given, inalienable rights to liberty, property and the 
pursuit of happiness, but these rights cannot be exercised unless we are alive . 
Consequently, the right to life is the most basic human right given to man by God . 
Also, as the Congregation goes on to say, "It is not within the competence of 
society or public authority, whatever its form, to give that right [that is, the right 
to life 1 to some and take it away from others. Any such grounds of race or sex, 
skin color or religion , is always unjust. The right to life does not derive from the 
favor of other human beings but exists prior to any such favor and must therefore 
be acknowledged as such. The denial of it is an injustice in the strict sense of the 
word." In short, human life is sacred; it emanates from the hand of God; the right 
to life is not some favor granted to human beings by society or the government 
but, rather , is a God-given right. As such , the right to life demands our acknowl-
edgment, respect and protection. 
From reading the Church's documents on love, sexuality and human life, it 
becomes readily apparent why so many of our modern advocates and practitioners 
of "free sex" or sexual irresponsibility consider the Catholic Church its primary 
foe. For them, sex is simply a plaything or a tool to enhance one's popularity or 
to alleviate one's doubts about one's masculinity or femininity. 
On the other hand, as the Church's documents clearly demonstrate, the Cath-
olic Church has a noble, beautiful view of sex, marriage, procreation, family and 
human life. For the Catholic Church, sex should be the communion of life and 
love within the sacrament of marriage. 
- Haven Bradford Gow 
Arlington Heights, TIl. 
Abortion: New Directions for Policy Studies 
Edward Manier, William Liu and David Soloman, Editors 
University of No tre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind. 46556, 1977. x + 186 pp., 
$9.95. 
Abortion: New Directions for Policy Studies is a collection of papers on abor-
tion presented at the University of Notre Dame in 1975 , together with reflections 
on these papers by the editors and an analysis of several 1976 abortion decisions 
by the Supreme Court. The papers collected here are from several disciplines-
comparative constitutional law, philosophy and sociology - and they deal with 
various aspects of the abortion issue. The editors seek to bring these papers 
together into a view which avoids as much as possible the partisan perspectives of 
the contending parties in the abortion controversy and which can thus suggest 
new lines of inquiry and the possibility for developing some sort of normative 
consensus on abortion. I think their effort fails. 
Nevertheless, the individual papers are all in one way or another valuable . 
Several of them are important contributions to the discussion of abortion - for 
example, Donald Kommers' insightful comparison of the abortion decisions of the 
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U.S. Supreme Court and of the West German Federal Constitutional Court. Thus, 
this volume is a useful addition to the non-medical literature on abortion. 
Judith Blake's contribution is a survey of the trend in public opinion on 
various aspects of abortion from the early 1960 's to 1975. Blake focuses upon the 
relation between public opinion and the liberal policy enjoined by the Supreme 
Court in 1973. She finds considerable discrepancy between the views of the Court 
and those of the public at large. Although the trend over the last 10 years is 
towards approval of a more permissive policy on abortion , a majority of people-
men as well as women and non-Catholics as well as Catholics - remain opposed to 
a public policy that puts no restrictions on abortion. 
Given the state of public opinion , Blake criticizes those proponents of liberal-
ized abortion who have refused to take seriously the threat to their program 
which is posed by right to life groups. These groups have effectively thwarted the 
implementation of the " spirit" of the 1973 decisions by non-compliance and by 
developing strategies of collateral deterrence. What is more , these groups may be 
having some impact on public opinion: between 1973 and 1975 the number of 
people believing that human life begins at conception has increased. 
This proposition that human life begins at conception is the focus of consider-
able attention in the philosophical contributions. Roger Wertheimer argues for 
what he calls "the Standard Belief" - that is , that a human being has human 
(moral) status in virtue of being a human being. Wertheimer's defense of this 
proposition is elegant and persuasive ; it includes a compelling criticism of philos-
ophers who make being a person - which is defined by properties other than 
simply being human - as the basis for having moral status. Thus, Wertheimer 
thinks that the disagreements about abortion are fundamentally disagreement; 
about whether the zygote or fetus is a human being. (See pp. 118, 120.) He claims 
that this question cannot be answered. His reason seems to be that "no neat set of 
conditions necessary and sufficient for being human is generally agreed on ," (p. 
124) as the abortion argument itself reveals. In particular , the anti-abortion argu-
ment does not show that the zygote is the same human being as the later adult ; it 
shows only that the zygote is the same human body which the later adult has. Just 
as a corpse is not the same human being as the living person , it is not clear that the 
human body of the zygote is the human being who will have that body. 
Edmund Pincoffs also argues that there is no condition or set of conditions 
necessary or sufficient for the determination of the humanity of such classes as 
the class of embryos. One such condition is being of human ancestry. His argu-
ment against the sufficiency of this condition for determining humanity begins 
with a recognition that a human egg fertilized by human sperm is a human 
fertilized egg. He gives three reasons why the human egg fertilized is not neces-
sarily a human being: monstrous births are of human ancestry but are doubtfully 
human; the genetic characteristics of human offspring can be made to vary 
widely by manipulating nucleic acids ; and programmed beings are doubtfully 
human though of human ancestry. Pincoffs does not, however, despair of some-
how rationally deciding whether or not some doubtfully human classes of entities 
are human. This issue can be resolved by a d ecision which need not be completely 
arbitrary; this decision should be based on the very conditions which he has 
argued are not necessary and sufficient to settle membership in the class of human 
beings. These conditions provide a rational basis for a decision but some arbitrari-
ness remains: "Sometimes the only way to achieve consensus is to entrust the 
decision to an Official Decider who, within the constraints of the going criteria , 
just decides" (p. 48). 
The editors present further arguments that the question of whether human life 
II begins at conception cannot be settled. One might suppose, then , that we are to 
conclude that since this question and other central questions in the abortion 
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con troversy cannot be settled , the parties to the controversy sho uld back off from 
the pa rt isa n excesses which charac teri ze the di spu te in order to avo id the norma-
tive chaos to which t hese excesses are leading. 
Such a conclusion is unlike ly to be acceptable to the contesting parties. For 
exampl e, the concern to develop consensus and to avoid normative chaos is 
like ly to see m less impOl·tan t to the anti-abortionist than the protection of 
unborn li fe. Mmeover, t he ant i-abmtionist is not irratio nal if he or she regards the 
arguments that the humani ty of the emb,·yo is no t settled to be less than defin-
itive. Many quest ions read il y come to mind : why shou ld lack of consensus on the 
question o f the humanity of t he fet us be dec isive? Is one's body identical with his 
cmpse in the same way as it is ide ntical with the embryo from which one came? 
How can a li vi ng hum an bei ng be distinguished from his or her living body? If 
monsters are do ubtfully human, wh y sho uld any embryo be a lso doubt fully 
human? If t he issue ca n 't be sett led on empirical or conceptual grounds , why must 
the dec is ion be in some m easure arbitrary? Does o ur pluralistic legal and moral 
system conta in no norms wh ich may be used to justify favoring the m embership 
of d is pu ted classes in humani ty? 
So it is by no means settled that th e question of t he humani ty o f the emb ryo is 
unsettled. The argu m ents about whethe r or not this quest ion and othe rs like it are 
sett led a re inev itabl y part of the part isa n controversy. This inev itab ility suggests 
tha t a Catholi c unive rs ity migh t bette r execute its civ ic responsibi li ty on issues 
like abortio n by p romoting the debate o r form ally getting in to it than by 
attempting to di scuss or to re-o rient the debate. If this were done, perhaps the 
anti-abortion posit io n which the editors rega rd as unsophisticated would get the 
academ ic elabora tion which m any Americans feel it dese rves. 
- Joseph M. Boyle , Jr. , Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy 
College of St. Thomas 
Encyclopedia 0/ Bioethics 
Warren T. Reich, Editor 
The Free Press, New York, N. Y., 1978. 4 vo lumes, $200.00. 
When t he first tentative questions and artic les in bioeth ics began to emerge 
som e two decades ago, few rea li zed the trem endous impact th ese q uest ions would 
have. Now we have the Encyclopedia of Bioethics which surely was not envis io ned 
when such questions were first ra ised , bu t which serves as an authentic confirma-
tio n bo t h o f the im portance of bi oethics as a fie ld of study in itse lf and its value 
in helping to address many contempora,-y d il emmas in t he life sc iences and health 
care . The basic p lll·pose of t he encyclopedia is not "to freeze kno wledge, but to 
summ arize and ana lyze the hi storical and current state of knowledge in bio-
eth ics. " Another purpose is to st imulate fu t ure ,-esearch , sure ly a unique goal for 
an encyclo ped ia. In th e fo ll owing, a genera l overv iew of the encyclopedia is given 
first , and t hen spec ific articl es o n th e fo ll ow ing topics are critic ized: abortion, 
death , in formed co nsent and population eth ics. 
One test of the promise of a project such as this is the quality of the ed itorial 
staff, the edi tmial adviso ry board, and the authors. Many of the editors and 
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